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INTRODUCTION
A world famous artist decides to compose a comic book. He
has little interest in creating his own original superhero, so he
elects to create five new stories about Superman.1 The artist
creates these new comic books, yet he does not make copies of his
compositions, and neglects to inform the owner of the Superman
copyright, DC Comics, of his undertaking. The artist instead sells
his takes on Superman comic books to five friends, each of whom
pay $10,000 for their very own original Superman composition.
Five years later, the artist finds he can no longer paint or draw
due to arthritis. Upon learning of this unfortunate change in
circumstance, one of the artist’s friends elects to sell his comic
book, reasoning that he can now reap a large profit from the sale
since the artist can no longer draw and the comic book is truly one
of a kind. The friend auctions off the comic book on eBay,2
making a profit of $500,000. This windfall piques DC Comics’
attention, and the comic book company sues the artist for copyright
infringement.
DC Comics faces a problem.3 Statute precludes lodging a
claim of copyright infringement “unless it is commenced within
three years after the claim accrued.”4 However, the Discovery and
injury rules impose divergent standards governing the juncture at

1

See, e.g., Jerome Siegel & Joe Schuster, Superman, ACTION COMICS 1, at 1
(Detective Comics, Inc. June 1938) (first appearance of Superman), reprinted in
SUPERMAN IN ACTION COMICS ARCHIVES, VOLUME ONE 11 (Bob Kahan ed., DC Comics
1997), available at http://superman.ws/tales2/action1/?page=1 (last visited Mar. 22,
2007). Citation format adopted from the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and
Entertainment Law Journal. Britton Payne, Comic Book Legal Citation Format,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1017–19 (2006).
2
eBay is an electronic auction website that allows individuals to sell goods to other
individuals via the Internet. See eBay Home Page, http://www.ebay.com.
3
DC Comics could possibly sue the artist for the sale involving the eBay auction. See
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). Under the Copyright Act, unlicensed distribution of copyrighted
material is a cause of action. See id. Distribution of any copy not “lawfully” made can be
subject to a civil claim and in our case, the comic books were unlawfully made. See
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000). The problem discussed herein lies with DC Comics ability to
recover for the initial sale.
4
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000).

RAMIREZ_FINAL_050807

1128

5/8/2007 1:07:28 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1125

which claims begin to accrue.5 Depending on which rule applies,
the statute of limitations may not have expired, thus DC Comics
may still be able to take legal action against the artist.
Under the discovery rule, accrual does not commence until “a
plaintiff knows of the infringement or is chargeable with such
knowledge,”6 but under the injury rule, a cause of action accrues at
the time infringement occurs.7 In the aforementioned situation, if
the federal statute of limitations for copyright infringement is
subject to the injury rule and the claim accrued five years ago, DC
cannot bring a case against the artist.8 If the statute of limitations
is subject to the discovery rule, however, DC could still initiate
proceedings so long as it did not know and could not have known
of the infringement until it learned of the eBay auction.9
The statute of limitations pertaining to copyright infringement
actions is representative of a more pervasive problem that plagues
certain federal statutes addressing time limits on filing claims. As
with copyright infringement legislation, many federal laws remain
silent with respect to which rule of accrual applies in a given
situation. Consequently, when a federal statute remains silent on
which rule of accrual is applicable, federal courts adopt a per se
discovery rule.10 The United States Supreme Court’s 2001
decision in TRW, Inc. v. Andrews11 fundamentally altered the rules
regarding when certain accrual rules applied in the context of
federal statutes of limitations, and left causes of action like
copyright infringement in limbo.12
This Note seeks to answer the question of which accrual rule
should apply in the context of copyright infringement litigation.
5

See Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 242–43
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Stephen M. Kramarsky, Running out the Clock, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
28, 2006, at col. 1.
6
Bridgeport Music, Inc., v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004).
7
Auscape Int’l, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
8
See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b).
9
See generally Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994)
(denying recovery for alleged infringement discovered and not sued upon with statute of
limitations).
10
Id. at 27.
11
534 U.S. 19 (2001).
12
Id. at 35.
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Part I addresses the status of the law governing both federal
statutes of limitations in general and for copyright infringement
prior to the Supreme Court’s TRW decision. Part II analyzes the
Supreme Court’s TRW decision in depth and assesses its holding in
this pivotal case. Part III first examines how courts have addressed
causes of action with unclear accrual rules outside of the realm of
copyright in the wake of the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, and
then considers judicial treatment of copyright infringement cases
subsequent to TRW, illuminating the differences. Part IV, through
statutory interpretation and examination of policy arguments for
statutes of limitations both in general and with respect to copyright
in particular, reaches a determination that the discovery rule is the
appropriate rule of accrual in the context of copyright infringement
litigation. Part V concludes with a recommendation on how courts
should employ the discovery rule when addressing statute of
limitations concerns in future copyright infringement actions.
I. PRE-TRW: MUCH SIMPLER TIMES?
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2001 TRW decision, a modicum
of uniformity existed with regard to which rule of accrual in the
context of federal statutes of limitations, despite the law’s statutory
silence on the issue. The statute of limitations rules for copyright
infringement actions were largely uniform, but some notable
exceptions nonetheless existed.
A. Pre-TRW: Non-Copyright Infringement Causes of Action
Where the Statute Remains Silent
Federal law typically neglects to define when the statute of
limitations starts to accrue for a given cause of action.13 The
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), for
example, unambiguously states that civil actions brought under this
legislation are subject to a statute of limitations of four years
duration.14 The point at which the clock starts to run on this fouryear time period, however, is another matter altogether. The
13
14

See id.
See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 553 (2000).
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Supreme Court wrestled with the question of which rule of accrual
applies in the civil RICO context in Rotella v. Wood.15 In Rotella,
the plaintiff brought a civil RICO case against a group of
physicians, alleging the doctors conspired to keep him at a
psychiatric facility for their own financial interest rather than his
own best interest.16 Doctors placed Rotella in the Brookhaven
Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged him in 1986.17 In
1994, the parent company of the facility pled guilty to fraud and
“illegal agreements between the company and its doctors.”18 In
1997, Rotella learned of this plea agreement and brought a civil
claim under RICO against the physicians.19 Rotella, however, had
failed to bring an action in 1986 when his alleged injury
occurred.20 While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
discovery rule is presumptively applicable when a federal statute is
silent, it declined to extend its holding into a “pattern discovery
rule,” deeming that such an extension would go against the
purpose of a statute of limitations.21
Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co.22 also recognized the
validity of the discovery rule. In this case, union trustees sued for
money lost due to the company’s underreporting of hours worked
and coal produced from 1977 through August 1979.23 The trustees
requested documents and audited Hallmark.24 After the trustees
completed their second audit on March 15, 1984, they learned that
Hallmark had failed to pay approximately $70,000.25 The trustees
then brought a breach of contract claim on March 3, 1987.26 The
presiding court acknowledged “at least eight federal courts of
15

Id.
Id. at 551 n.1.
17
Id. at 551.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 558–59.
21
Id. at 555–56. The “pattern discovery rule” would dictate that the statute of
limitations does not begin for a RICO civil claim until the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the conspiracy, not just the single act. Id. at 553.
22
935 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
23
Id. at 337.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
16
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appeals have, within the last four years, agreed . . . that the
discovery rule is the general accrual rule in federal courts.”27 The
court added that in federal question cases, most states adopt the
standard that absent an expressed directive from Congress
indicating otherwise, the discovery rule should apply.28
In the context of Rotella, the question of whether the injury or
discovery rule applied was of little consequence, because the time
period between the accrual and the initiation of the case exceeded
the time frame either rule established.29 In Hallmark, however, the
decision regarding which rule of accrual should apply was crucial
to the trustees’ ability to sustain their claim. Adoption of the
injury rule would have required the plaintiffs to bring the cause of
action within three years of Hallmark’s misrepresentation of its
funds, before August 1982.30 Use of the discovery rule, however,
allowed the Trustees to bring their claim without fear of
preclusion.31
B. Pre-TRW: The Rule of Accrual for Suits Brought under the
Copyright Act
Before TRW, the rule of accrual for the federal statute of
limitations in copyright infringement actions was relatively
uniform, yet nonetheless harbored its share of competing views.32
Although there appeared to be a split within the Ninth Circuit prior
to TRW regarding which rule of accrual was appropriate in the
context of copyright infringement cases, the Second and Ninth
Circuits generally agreed that the discovery rule should apply in
such actions.33

27

Id. at 342.
Id. (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990)).
29
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 559 n.4 (2000).
30
See Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
31
See id. at 340–41.
32
See Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994); Entous v.
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154–55 (C.D.C.A. 2001). But see L.A. News
Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Inc., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998).
33
Roley, 19 F.3d at 481; Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992).
28
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1. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit maintained that the discovery rule of
accrual should apply to statute of limitations questions in copyright
infringement actions.34
In Stone v. Williams, Stone, the
illegitimate daughter of country-western singer Hank Williams Sr.,
sued the singer’s son for copyright renewals under the Copyright
Act of 1976.35 The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s cause of
action accrued when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that
Hank Williams Sr. was her father.36 The court determined that
Stone could not have known that Hank Williams Sr. was her father
until 1979.37 Even under the discovery rule, the statute of
limitations would have barred Stone’s suit, which she filed in
1985, were it not for the fact that the alleged infringement was
ongoing. Because of the ongoing infringement, however, the court
merely precluded Stone from recovering damages from
infringement that occurred prior to 1982, three years before Stone
filed suit, rather than foreclosing Stone’s ability to bring a claim
altogether.38
In the 1996 case Merchant v. Levy, the Second Circuit followed
the precedent it established in Stone, solidifying its adoption of the
position that the discovery rule of accrual should apply in civil
claims filed under the Copyright Act of 1976.39 In Merchant, selfproclaimed co-owners of a copyright attempted to assert their
rights over those of the plaintiffs, Jimmy Merchant and Herman
Santiago.40 The plaintiffs brought their suit in 1987.41 The court
applied the discovery rule, and held that since the plaintiffs could
have known of their ownership rights as early as 1961, the statute
of limitations barred their cause of action.42 Taken together Stone
34

Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996); Stone, 970 F.2d at 1048.
970 F.2d at 1043.
36
Stone, 970 F.2d at 1046, 1047.
37
Id. at 1049, 1051.
38
Id. at 1051.
39
Merchant, 92 F.3d at 56.
40
Id. at 53.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 56. Merchant is an interesting case because it deals with continuing
infringement. Id. In that respect, Merchant failed to follow Stone and did not allow for
any claims of ownership after the statute of limitations ran. Id. Much could be said about
35

RAMIREZ_FINAL_050807

2007

5/8/2007 1:07:28 PM

COPYRIGHT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1133

and Merchant establish the discovery rule as the prevailing rule of
accrual for civil claims brought under the Copyright Act of 1976 in
the Second Circuit.43
2. The Ninth Circuit
Prior to TRW, the Ninth Circuit adopted the discovery rule as
the standard rule of accrual in cases implicating statute of
limitations concerns. Nevertheless, some confusion lingered
within the Ninth Circuit, regarding whether the discovery rule was
the appropriate rule of accrual to employ in the context of
copyright infringement claims.44 This confusion arose largely
from the erroneous citation of a single case: Roley v. New World
Pictures.45 Most cases, both before and after TRW, and both
within the Ninth Circuit and outside of it, cite Roley as the
standard.46
In Roley, the author of a screenplay later renamed “Sleep Tight
Little Sister” gave the original copy of his screenplay to a friend in
1985.47 In 1987, the author, Roley, viewed a film this same friend
wrote entitled “Sister Sister.”48 Roley concluded that this movie
used what was essentially his screenplay.
Without any
compensation to or consent from Roley, “Sister Sister” aired on
television in 1988 and 1992.49
Roley filed a copyright
continuing infringement and how it affects the statute of limitations under the competing
rules of accrual. However, to enter into a discussion of this issue would be tangential to
our purposes of determining what rule is appropriate.
43
Another case that utilized the discovery rule was Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55 (2d
Cir. 2000), which dealt with song infringement.
44
See Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994); Entous v.
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2001). But see L.A. News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998).
45
19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994).
46
Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481);
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing
Roley, 19 F.3d at 481); Reuters, 149 F.3d at 992 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481); Crane
Design, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Constr., LLC., 2006 WL 692019 (W.D. Wash) (citing Kourtis,
419 F.3d at 999 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481)); Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d
1244, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481); Entous, 151 F. Supp. 2d at
1155 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481).
47
Roley, 19 F.3d at 480.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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infringement claim on February 7, 1991.50 The presiding court
employed the discovery rule and precluded Roley from recovering
damages for infringement in 1987, holding that the statute of
limitations accrued in 1987, when Roley first discovered the
infringement through viewing “Sister Sister.”51 The court did rule,
however, that due to continuing infringement, Roley was free to
seek damages for any infringement that occurred on or after
February 7, 1988.52
Although many courts cite Roley as the controlling case on
which rule of accrual applies in copyright infringement actions, the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis rationalizing its decision to apply the
discovery rule in Roley is nonexistent. The Roley court cited two
cases that wrestled with question of which rule of accrual should
apply in copyright infringement cases implicating statute of
limitations concerns, but neither of these cases contain discussions
of the discovery rule.53 Rather, those courts only discuss tolling
the statute of limitations through the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment.54 Thus, in deciding Roley, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit created precedent for applying the discovery rule.
In Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television
International, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit incorrectly cited Roley as
precedent for using the injury rule, rather than the discovery rule,
in determining the rule of accrual for copyright infringement

50

Id. at 481.
Id.
52
Id. This is three years prior to Roley bringing the cause of action. Id. Roley is
another continuing infringement case in which the Court chose to follow the Stone
standard and allow for a cause of action for continuing infringement, not only for the
initial accrual period. Id.
53
Taylor v. Meirek, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983); Wood v. Santa Barbara
Chambers of Commerce, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1128, 1135 (D. Nev. 1980).
54
See Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1118; Wood, 507 F. Supp. at 1135. Fraudulent concealment
is when a prospective defendant takes “active steps” to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a
timely suit. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir.
2004). An argument could be made that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment helps
determine which accrual rule is appropriate. If an injury rule is adopted, fraudulent
concealment can serve as a layer of protection for plaintiffs who were unable to bring suit
with in the three-year period. A discussion of fraudulent concealment in its entirety is
beyond the scope of this paper because fraudulent concealment could not protect against
the infringement that DC Comics suffered in our situation.
51
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actions raising statute of limitation concerns.55 Here, the defendant
duplicated and then profited from a copyrighted video of the 1992
Los Angeles Riots, which stemmed from the acquittal of the police
officers charged with beating Rodney King.56 The presiding court
ruled that “[a] claim accrues when an act of infringement
occurs.”57 Though the question of which rule of accrual applied
was factually immaterial in this case, because the plaintiff would
not be time-barred from seeking damages under either rule, the
court unmistakably applied the injury rule rather than the discovery
rule.58
Despite the misunderstanding in Reuters, the Ninth Circuit
plainly adopted the discovery rule as the applicable rule of accrual
regarding statute of limitations questions in copyright infringement
actions in Entous v. Viacom International, Inc.59 The court
addressed the question of whether a contract could trump the
statute of limitations and the accrual rule applicable to the statute.60
Citing Roley, the court acknowledged the discovery rule as the
appropriate rule of accrual in the context copyright infringement
actions raising statute of limitations concerns.61 The court then
held that parties are free to contract to a modified accrual rule and
statute of limitations period, as long as the period is reasonable.62
II. TRW: THE RULE OF ACCRUAL WHEN THE
STATUTE REMAINS SILENT?
In the 2001 case TRW v. Andrews, the Supreme Court altered
the standard for determining the appropriate rule of accrual for a
federal statute of limitations when the law is silent on this
TRW involved the Fair Credit Reporting Act
question.63
(“FCRA”), a piece of legislation that remains silent on the question
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 990.
Id. at 992 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481).
Id.
151 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1156.
534 U.S. 19, 22 (2001).
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of which rule of accrual applies to its provisions.64 The FCRA
states that:
An action to enforce any liability created under this
subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States
district court, without regard to the amount in controversy,
or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, not later
than the earlier of . . .
(1) 2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the
violation that is the basis for such liability; or
(2) 5 years after the date on which the violation that is the
basis for such liability occurs.65
The plaintiff, Andrews, brought suit under the FCRA against
TRW, a credit reporting agency, which disclosed Andrews’ credit
report on multiple occasions at the behest of an identity thief.66
TRW released credit reports to other companies at the identity
thief’s request on July 25, 1994, September 27, 1994, October 28,
1994 and January 3, 1995.67 Andrews learned of these disclosures
on May 31, 199568 and filed suit against TRW on October 21,
1996.69 Because the FCRA imposed a two-year statute of
limitations, the two competing rules of accrual—the discovery rule
and the injury rule—would yield divergent results on the question
of whether the applicable statute of limitations would bar Andrews
from seeking damages from the first of the aforementioned
disclosures.70
The Court held in TRW that where no explicit statement
regarding the applicable rule of accrual exists in a federal statute, a
court must look at the relevant statute to determine if a certain rule
should be adopted by implication.71 While the Court did not
definitively rule on whether courts should employ the discovery
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2000).
TRW, 534 U.S. at 24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1681p; TRW, 534 U.S. at 22.
See TRW, 534 U.S. at 28, 31.
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rule whenever federal law is silent on the rule of accrual issue,72 it
did overturn the Ninth Circuit rule that unless Congress expressly
states otherwise, courts should apply the discovery rule in such
situations.73 Although the Ninth Circuit had ruled that FCRA was
in fact silent on the accrual issue, the Supreme Court agreed
instead with the district court, holding that FCRA is not silent on
this question.74 The Court noted that a subsection of the FCRA
calls for the application of the discovery rule in actions brought
under the FCRA.75 The relevant provision of the FCRA expressly
states that a plaintiff must bring an action within two years of
discovery of a violation in order to comport with the FCRA’s twoyear statute of limitation.76 The Court applied the principle of
statutory construction—that no clause or sentence should be
considered void or superfluous—to construe this term as
controlling.77 The Court reasoned that if the general discovery rule
applied under the FCRA, the specific provision mandating a twoyear discovery rule would be superfluous, and the distinction
between the five-year period and the two-year period would be
useless.78 Consequently, the Court held that lower courts must
apply the injury rule of accrual to any claim brought under the
FCRA unless the statute expressly states otherwise.79
III. AFTERMATH OF TRW
The Supreme Court’s TRW decision affected not only the
Copyright Act of 1976, but also numerous other federal laws silent
on the rule of accrual that applied to their statute of limitations
72

Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28. It is important to realize the distinction between a general presumption of a
discovery rule and what some Ninth Circuit courts used as the principal for adopting a
discovery rule. As seen above, though most cases in the Ninth Circuit appear to just
adopt a discovery rule, there is some precedent stating that Congress must expressly state
that an injury rule should be used or the courts must apply a discovery rule. See id. at 27.
TRW holds that Congress can implicitly choose what rule to adopt. See id. at 28.
74
Id. at 28.
75
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1681p.
76
15 U.S.C. § 1681p(1).
77
See id.; TRW, 534 U.S. at 31.
78
TRW, 534 U.S. at 28.
79
See id. at 33.
73
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provision.80 As addressed infra, the question of how much the
TRW decision has changed the standards for assessing federal
statute of limitations questions remains unanswered. While there
appears to be little confusion in general regarding the standards
courts now employ when adopting rules of accrual, within the
context of copyright infringement, various federal courts have
reached divergent outcomes when applying the standard the
Supreme Court laid out in its TRW decision.81
A. Post-TRW: Non-Copyright Infringement Causes of Action
Outside of copyright infringement cases, a consensus appears
to exist regarding the circumstances under which courts should
employ the TRW standard to determine the appropriate rule of
accrual for a statute of limitation provision that remains silent on
this question.82 Additionally, outside of the statute of limitations
context, lower courts have adopted the TRW standard for statutory
interpretation purposes.83 With respect to litigation under the
FCRA, for example, lower courts have followed the mandate the
Supreme Court set down in TRW, holding that the injury rule is
applicable rule of accrual for actions brought under this
legislation.84
In Claybrooks v. Primus Automotive Financial Services, Inc., a
Tennessee district court confronted a question similar to that which

80

See, e.g., Claybrooks v. Primus Auto. Fin. Serv., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974–75
(M.D. Tenn. 2005) (applying TRW’s analysis to determine rule of accrual for the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act); Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235,
244, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying TRW’s analysis to determine rule of accrual
under the Copyright Act).
81
See, e.g., Crane Design, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Constr., LLC., Not Reported in F. Supp.
2d, No. C05-251RSM, 2006 WL 692019, *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (declining to
use TRW’s analysis since TRW addressed claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, not
the Copyright Act); but see Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244, 246–47 (adopting TRW’s
analysis to determine rule of accrual for the Copyright Act).
82
See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003); Claybrooks,
363 F. Supp. 2d at 974–75.
83
Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 475 (D. Conn. 2006).
84
See, e.g., Saraiva v. Citigroup, Inc., Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, No. 01 CIV 3298
LMM, 2002 WL 227070, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2002) (holding that TRW has established
that a general discovery rule, other than the one specified in the statute, does not apply to
Federal Credit Reporting Act).
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the Supreme Court addressed in TRW, but regarding the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) rather than the FCRA.85 In
Claybrooks, multiple plaintiffs filed suit under the ECOA alleging
that the defendant, Primus, maintained a discriminatory credit
pricing system.86 While the plaintiffs admitted that Primus first
subjected them to this pricing system in 1999, they did not
commence their litigation until 2002.87 Consequently, the district
court had to undertake a two-step analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims.
The court first had to determine the appropriate rule of accrual for
the two-year statute of limitations the ECOA established, since the
legislation itself remained silent on the issue. Next, using the
applicable rule of accrual, it had to ascertain whether the plaintiffs
were time-barred from filing suit under the ECOA.88 The court
acknowledged that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
TRW, no presumption that the discovery rule was the proper rule of
accrual existed.89 The court then looked to the text of the ECOA
which states in pertinent part:
(f) Jurisdiction of courts; time for maintenance of action;
exceptions
Any action under this section may be brought in the
appropriate United States district court without regard to
the amount in controversy, or in any other court of
competent jurisdiction. No such action shall be brought
later than two years from the date of the occurrence of the
violation, except that—
(1) whenever any agency having responsibility for
administrative enforcement under section 1691c of this title
commences an enforcement proceeding within two years
from the date of the occurrence of the violation,
(2) whenever the Attorney General commences a civil
action under this section within two years from the date of
the occurrence of the violation,
85
86
87
88
89

363 F. Supp. 2d at 971, 973.
Id. at 971.
Id.
Id. at 973, 977–983.
Id. at 974–75.
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then any applicant who has been a victim of the
discrimination which is the subject of such proceeding or
civil action may bring an action under this section not later
than one year after the commencement of that proceeding
or action.90
After analyzing this portion of the statute, the district court
concluded that the ECOA is not silent on the question of the
appropriate rule of accrual, and that the phrase “date of
occurrence” renders the ECOA’s two-year statue of limitations
subject to the injury rule of accrual.91 The court also noted that a
provision of the ECOA expressly creates an exception to the
applicability of the injury rule.92 The court concluded that the
phrase “except that” in the ECOA explicitly carves out an
exception to the general “date of occurrence” rule and
simultaneously precludes the applicability of the discovery rule of
accrual to the ECOA’s two-year statute of limitations.93
The First Circuit, however, adhered expressly to the Supreme
Court’s holding in TRW in it addressed the question of which rule
of accrual was proper in the context of the two-year statute of
limitations contained within the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”).94 In Skwira v. United States, the plaintiffs sued the
federal government after a nurse in a Veterans Affairs Medical
Center murdered their family member.95 The death occurred in
1996, a criminal proceeding concluded with the conviction of the
nurse in 1998, and the plaintiffs filed their civil suit in 1999.96 The
statute of limitations provision of the FTCA states in pertinent part:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever
barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate
Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or
unless action is begun within six months after the date of
mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (2000) (emphasis added).
Claybrooks, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 975, 977 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f)).
Id. at 976.
Id. at 975–76.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1927); Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003).
Skwira, 344 F.3d at 67.
Id. at 67, 70.
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denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented.97
The court analyzed FTCA, but in contrast to the statutes and
cases discussed supra, it concluded that no express provision
indicating which rule, or rules, of accrual should apply in the
context of the FTCA existed within the legislation.98 The court
ended its analysis of legislative intent with this finding, and moved
on to examine other laws in which the discovery rule is the
appropriate accrual scheme.99 The court ultimately held that
claims under the FTCA are subject to the discovery rule for statute
of limitations accrual purposes,100 but ruled that the plaintiffs’
were nonetheless time-barred from filing claims under the FTCA
since they could have filed a claim in 1996, once the autopsy
determined that their family member died of unnatural causes.101
From these cases, it appears that the question of whether a
lower court will apply the Supreme Court’s TRW rule when
interpreting the appropriate rule of accrual for a given statute of
limitation hinges upon the text of the legislation at issue. If a
statute is truly silent on the question of the appropriate rule of
accrual as FTCA is, then courts will apply the discovery rule,102
but if a statute contains explicit exceptions to a given accrual rule
like FCRA and ECOA, courts will employ the injury rule.103

97

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000).
Skwira, 344 F.3d at 74 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)). The Court points out that the
law of torts is a creature of common law and not born from statutes. Id. at 74–75.
99
The Court, though finished with TRW, continued to assess which rule to adopt. The
Court assessed other areas of law where a discovery rule is used such as medical
malpractice and latent disease. Id. at 73. The Court looked at two reasons that should
instruct a court to adopt a discovery rule. Id. When it is possible that the plaintiff is left
without a remedy due to the cause of action arising after the statutory period and when
the nature of the cause of action relies on someone’s knowledge, other than the
plaintiff’s. See id.
100
Id. at 75.
101
Id. at 81.
102
See id.
103
For FCRA analysis, see TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001). For ECOA
analysis, see Claybrooks v. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 969 (M.D.
Tenn. 2005).
98
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B. Post-TRW: The Rule of Accrual for Copyright Infringement
The aforementioned uniformity regarding rule of accrual
analysis in the wake of the Supreme Court’s TRW decision,
however, has yet to pervade the realm of statute of limitations
concerns in copyright infringement actions.104 A portion of the
Second Circuit has adopted the injury rule in the context of such
actions,105 while the Ninth Circuit has in contrast adopted the
discovery rule.106 The Sixth Circuit has adopted the discovery rule
as well, using Roley as its controlling authority.107 The Second
Circuit, however, appears to be the only circuit that has employed
the rule of accrual analysis framework the Supreme Court laid out
in TRW; the other circuits mention TRW only in passing.108
1. The Second Circuit
Following the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, district courts in
the Second Circuit opted to continue to adhere to the discovery
rule regarding statute of limitations questions in the context
copyright infringement actions. In 2004, Judge Kaplan delivered a
decision reversing this trend.109 In 2006, courts in the Southern
District of New York decided two copyright infringement cases in
which the injury rule prevailed.110
In 2002, a court in the Southern District of New York
reasserted its desire to apply the discovery rule in Sapon v. DC
Comics.111 In 2004, however, Judge Kaplan, also sitting in the
104

See Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241–49 (S.D.N.Y.
2004). But see Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2005).
105
See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 241–49.
106
See Kourtis, 419 F.3d at 999–1000.
107
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, LTD., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir.
2004) (citing Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994)).
108
See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244. But see Crane Design v. Pacific Coast Constr.,
No. C05-251RSM, 2006 WL 692019, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006).
109
See Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992(WHP), 2002 WL 485730, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002). But see Auscape 409 F. Supp. 2d at 241–49.
110
Kwan v. Schlein, 441 F. Supp. 2d. 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Roberts v. Keith, No.
04 Civ. 10079 (CSH), 2006 WL 547252, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2006) (using the injury
rule and citing Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 247).
111
Sapon, 2006 WL 485730 at *5. Sapon sued DC Comics for copyright infringement
on his character, the “Black Bat.” Id. Because the court employed the discovery rule,
Sapon could only bring a cause of action for infringement that occurred during or after
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Southern District of New York, handed down a decision that may
change both the manner in which courts address rule of accrual
concerns in the realm of copyright infringement actions and the
Copyright Act of 1976 forever.112 In Auscape International v.
National Geographic Society, Judge Kaplan adopted the injury rule
in place of the discovery rule in a copyright infringement action.113
In Auscape, freelance writers and photographers filed suit against
National Geographic over its practice of compiling back issues of
its publication in microform and electronic media editions.114
Judge Kaplan found that any direct infringement on the part of
National Geographic occurred on or before 1993,115 but that
ProQuest, another defendant in the case, infringed the plaintiffs’
copyrights until 1996.116 The plaintiffs filed suit on January 31,
2002,117 asserting that they could not have known of the
infringement until the year they commenced their litigation.118 The
plaintiffs’ ability to persist with their claims hinged upon the
question of which rule of accrual applied to the statute of
limitations for copyright infringement actions.119
Judge Kaplan commenced his analysis by distinguishing the
case at issue from the Merchant and Stone decisions, holding that
those cases dealt with co-ownership of a copyright, rather than
infringement.120 Next, Judge Kaplan acknowledged that while
federal courts, as a general rule, had previously applied the
discovery rule when a given statute of limitation remained silent on
the question of an appropriate complementary rule of accrual, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in TRW fundamentally altered this
precedent.121 Judge Kaplan noted that “TRW requires examination

1999. Id. Unrelated to the accrual rule issue, Sapon was unsuccessful in all of his claims
and was actually found to be the infringing party. Id. at *7.
112
See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 241–249.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 237.
115
Id. at 241.
116
Id. at 242.
117
Id. at 241.
118
Id. at 242.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 243.
121
Id. at 244.
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of the statutory structure and legislative history in determining
whether a discovery or injury rule should apply . . . .”122
While Judge Kaplan observed that the statute of limitations
provision in the Copyright Act of 1976 states that “[n]o civil action
shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is
commenced within three years after the claim accrued,”123 his
analysis of the statutory text itself ended with this concise
reflection. Judge Kaplan reasoned that in contrast to the statute of
limitations provision of the FCRA, which the Supreme Court
confronted in TRW, the statute of limitations clause in the
Copyright Act of 1976 contained no exceptions or other alternative
provisos that might lead a court to deduce that the legislation’s
statute of limitations favors one rule of accrual over another.124
Unlike the Skwira court, however, Judge Kaplan did not conclude
his analysis at this juncture, but rather delved into an examination
of the legislative intent behind the Copyright Act of 1976’s statute
of limitations clause.125
Congress first subjected civil copyright infringement actions to
a statute of limitations provision when it amended the Copyright
Act in 1957.126 Judge Kaplan looked at the hearing notes relating
to this 1957 amendment in an effort to ascertain Congress’ intent
in amending the Copyright Act to include a statute of limitations
proviso.127 Judge Kaplan concluded that Congress sought through
its 1957 amendment of the Copyright Act to establish a uniform
timeframe within which plaintiffs could bring copyright
infringement actions, since the Copyright Act was at that time
subject to state law and thus vulnerable to manipulation through
forum shopping.128 Judge Kaplan gleaned from the Senate
committee notes on the Copyright Act amendment that Congress
believed a three-year statute of limitations provided lawful
122

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000); Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
124
Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 245; Act of Aug. 19, 1957, 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1961 (discussing the
1957 amendment to the Copyright Act which provided a statute of limitations for civil
copyright actions).
123
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copyright holders with a sufficient amount of time to commence
legal action following infringement of their copyrights.129 Judge
Kaplan further stated that it appeared from the Senate committee
notes that state laws at the time of the 1957 Copyright Act
amendment all employed the injury rule for statute of limitations
accrual purposes, and that Congress’ goal in amending the federal
Copyright Act was increased certainty.130
Employing the
discovery rule for statute of limitations accrual calculations in the
context of copyright infringement actions, Judge Kaplan noted,
would consequently run contrary to the legislative intent behind
Congress’ 1957 amendment of the Copyright Act.131 Judge Kaplan
concluded his analysis by distinguishing copyright infringement
actions from copyright ownership disputes, noting that ownership
disputes do not arise until a co-owner of a copyright attempts to
exercise exclusive rights over a jointly owned piece of intellectual
property.132 Following his detailed analysis of Congress’ historical
legislative intent regarding the imposition of a statute of limitations
in copyright infringement actions, Judge Kaplan held that the
injury rule should apply to statute of limitations accrual tabulations
in the realm of copyright infringement actions, and that adoption of
this rule barred all of the plaintiffs’ claims in the case.133
Recent Southern District of New York cases echo Judge
Kaplan’s holding in Auscape.134 In Kwan v. Schlein, the court
concluded that the case at hand concerned solely an issue of coownership of a copyright, and consequently applied the discovery
rule.135 In Roberts v. Keith, the court, grappling with an
infringement claim, cited Auscape and employed the injury rule.136

129

Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 245; 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1962.
Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 245–46.
131
Id. at 247.
132
Id. The ownership provision is located in a separate section of the Copyright Act. 17
U.S.C. § 201 (2006). Under the Copyright Act, any claim brought is subject to the same
statute of limitations. Id. at § 507.
133
See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
134
Kwan v. Schlein, 441 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Roberts v. Keith,
No. 04 Civ. 10079 (CSH), 2006 WL 547252, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2006) (using the
injury rule and citing Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 247).
135
Kwan, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 498–99.
136
Roberts, 2006 WL 547252 at *3.
130
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2. The Ninth Circuit
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit applies the
discovery rule when confronted with statute of limitations accrual
questions in the copyright infringement realm.137 As discussed in
Part I(B)(ii) infra, however, the Ninth Circuit’s misguided citation
of Roley in Reuters produced a slight hiccup in the circuit’s
jurisprudence on this issue. This irregularity came to a head in
2002, when a district court in the Central District of California,
subject to Ninth Circuit review on appeal, cited Reuters and
applied the incorrect rule of accrual in a copyright infringement
action.138 Application of the appropriate rule of accrual, however,
proved inconsequential in this case after the court concluded that
the defendants did not infringe on the plaintiffs’ copyright.139
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the discovery rule governs statute of limitations
accrual calculations in copyright infringement actions.140 In
Kourtis v. Cameron, the plaintiffs filed a copyright infringement
claim against the makers of the film Terminator 2.141 The
plaintiffs’ claim related to the shape shifting ability of the main
character in their proposed film, The Minotaur.142 To wit, the lead
villain in Terminator II possessed the same shape-shifting ability
as the main character in The Minotaur.143 The plaintiffs proposed
The Minotaur to the defendants in 1989, and in 1991 the
defendants released Terminator 2, which the plaintiffs contended
infringed on their copyrighted work.144 The court, applying the
discovery rule for accrual purposes, held that while the statute of
limitations barred the plaintiffs from recovering for infringement
stemming from the initial release of Terminator 2, the plaintiffs
remained free to pursue claims relating to any infringement that
137
Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Newton v. Diamond,
204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters
Television Int’l et al., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998)).
138
Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
139
Id. at 1260.
140
Kourtis, 419 F.3d at 999.
141
Id. at 993.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
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occurred within the three years immediately preceding the filing of
their suit.145 Tellingly, the court never mentioned TRW in its
decision, but it did cite Roley, and did so without conducting a
post-TRW analysis.146
In 2006, the Western District of Washington, subject to the
Ninth Circuit for appellate review, followed Kourtis in Crane
Design, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Construction, LLC.147 In this case the
plaintiff, Crane, sued for infringement on the copyrights it held for
its building designs.148 The defendant construction company used
Crane’s designs in conjunction with buildings they worked on
from 2001 into 2003.149 Crane did not learn of the defendant’s
infringing use of its designs until a 2003 phone call.150 The court,
citing Roley and Kourtis, applied the discovery rule and held that
since the statute of limitations had not accrued, Crane was free to
pursue its infringement claims pertaining to actions the defendant
undertook prior to 2003.151 In contrast to the Kourtis court, the
Crane court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s TRW ruling, but
distinguished the decision as applicable only within the framework
of the FCRA, and thus not controlling in the context of cases
brought under Copyright Act.152
3. The Sixth Circuit
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has adopted the
discovery rule when calculating statute of limitations accruals in
copyright infringement actions in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
TRW decision.153 In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time,
Ltd., the plaintiff filed suit alleging infringement of music
copyrights it held.154 While the Sixth Circuit never ruled on the
question of when the infringement began, it found that the
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

See id. at 999–1000.
Id.
2006 WL 692019 (W.D. Wash.).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 885–86.

RAMIREZ_FINAL_050807

1148

5/8/2007 1:07:28 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1125

defendants did not engage in any infringement after 1998.155
Although the court applied the discovery rule, even the accrual
calculation tabulated under this method barred the plaintiffs from
persisting with their claims.156 The court did not analyze TRW,
and instead simply cited Roley, a pre-TRW case, as the controlling
authority on the accrual rule question.157
IV. WHICH RULE IS PROPER?
Up to this point, this Note has addressed what has essentially
been a battle between two circuits. Both the Second and Ninth
Circuits wrestled with federal statutes of limitations that remain
silent on the question of which accrual rule applies under their
auspices. In the context of the accrual rule applicable in copyright
infringement actions, the two circuits are at an impasse. The
Second Circuit conducts the most thorough analysis and addresses
the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, while the Ninth Circuit’s
attention to TRW is essentially non-existent.
A. Application of TRW by Courts: What Does TRW Stand For and
What Should it Stand For?
The case law splits into three various analyses of the Supreme
Court’s TRW decision and three different interpretations of which
accrual rule should apply when a federal state of limitations
remains silent on this issue.158 It is apparent from other court’s
construal of TRW that two of these interpretations are likely more
correct than the third.
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Interpretation
The Ninth Circuit has yet to consider how the Supreme Court’s
TRW ruling applies in the realm of copyright infringement actions.
In Crane, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme
155

Id. at 889.
See id. at 889–91.
157
Id. at 889.
158
See Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005); Skwira v. United States, 344
F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2003). But see Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 409 F. Supp. 2d
235 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
156
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Court’s TRW ruling only applied to the FCRA, and does not
control in the domain of Copyright Act.159 The Supreme Court
never stated in TRW that its analysis of the FCRA should apply in
all situations in which a statute of limitations remains silent on the
question of the appropriate complementary rule of accrual.160
Moreover, the Court never rejected the general presumption that
the discovery rule applies when a statute of limitation remains
silent on the accrual rule question.161 The Court only held that the
Ninth Circuit was wrong to presume that Congress must enact
explicit legislation in order to counteract this presumption.162
While the Supreme Court expressly overruled only one method of
assessing accrual rules, the methodology the Supreme Court
employed in TRW applies to all statutes of limitations that remain
silent on the question of which rule of accrual applies under their
auspices.163
Finally, Roley, the Ninth Circuit’s controlling
authority on the question of which accrual applies in the context of
copyright infringement when a statute of limitations remains silent
on the issue, fails to conduct any analysis whatsoever of why the
discovery rule should apply over the injury rule.164
2. The First Circuit’s Interpretation: The Narrow TRW
In Skwira v. United States, the First Circuit deferred to the
Supreme Court’s TRW decision, and consequently limited its
holding to statutes containing written exceptions to a given accrual
rule.165 The First Circuit in Skwira and the Supreme Court in TRW
employed highly similar analytical methodologies.166 In Skwira,
159
Crane Design, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Const., LLC., 2006 WL 692019 at *4 (W.D.
Wash.).
160
See generally TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (noting that the FCRA
specifies a limited discovery exception in the statute, which implicitly demonstrates
Congress’ intent to exclude the application of a general discovery rule).
161
Id. at 25–26.
162
Id.
163
See generally id.
164
See Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994).
165
Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003).
166
Compare TRW, 534 U.S. at 31 (enactment of discovery rule as an exception indicates
congressional intent to apply injury rule as general rule), with Skwira, 344 F.3d (absence
of such an exception in the statute permits application of the discovery rule as the general
rule).
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the First Circuit, after finding no express exceptions in the statute
at issue, adopted the general presumption favoring applicability of
the discovery rule, which the Supreme Court had yet to reject at
that juncture.167 The First Circuit’s narrow interpretation limits
analysis in the mold of TRW to legislative intent via statutory
construction only, and dispenses with examination of legislative
committee notes. The First Circuit’s treatment of accrual rule
questions remains valid because it shares its analytical
methodology with the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, and
diverges only in its application of a general rule that the Supreme
Court never explicitly overruled.168
3. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation: The Broad TRW
In Auscape, a district court in the Southern District of New
York, subject to the Second Circuit in the event of appellate
review, took its analysis of TRW a step further than Skwira when it
employed committee notes to assess Congress’ legislative intent.169
This Southern District methodology flows logically from the
Supreme Court’s TRW decision, wherein the Court undertook an
analysis of Congress’ legislative intent in enacting the FCRA
before it concluded that Congress intended the injury accrual rule
to apply to the FCRA’s statute of limitations.170
4. The Proper Application of TRW
Of these interpretations of TRW, the First Circuit’s is the most
accurate and astute. TRW does not resolve the question of which
accrual rule applies when a statute of limitations remains silent on
the issue.171 The Supreme Court could have easily rejected the
presumption favoring application of the discovery rule outright in
167

Skwira, 344 F.3d at 75.
See id. The Court in TRW looked at the statute and then made its decision. There is
some dicta referring to legislative intent but that was not part of the Court’s analysis. See
TRW, 534 U.S. at 31–33.
169
Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244–47 (S.D.N.Y.
2004).
170
TRW, 534 U.S. at 33 (“As TRW notes, however, Congress also heard testimony
urging it to enact a statute of limitations that runs from ‘the date on which the violation is
discovered’ but declined to do so.”).
171
TRW, 534 U.S. at 27.
168
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TRW, but it did not go that far.172 This is not to say that if the
Court were to decide a question of the applicable accrual rule for a
given statute of limitations they would decline to undertake an
Auscape-like analysis, but extrapolating the Court’s TRW holding
beyond the limited context in which the decision applies is
somewhat presumptuous. If a court were to analyze a statute of
limitations silent on the question of an applicable complementary
rule of accrual using the Auscape methodology, it would flounder
if it could not rely on information capable of providing insight into
Congress’s legislative intent. Additionally, to borrow an argument
from TRW, adoption of the Auscape court’s analytical
methodology would negate the still-valid general presumption
favoring applicability of the discovery rule when a statute of
limitations remains silent on the accrual rule question. The
Supreme Court plainly did not intend to overrule this general
presumption favoring applicability of the discovery rule, for if it
did, it would have expressly stated as much, and proffered the
analytical framework it employed in TRW as the only means of
determining the appropriate accrual rule for a given statute of
limitation.
While the Auscape court’s analytical methodology may
constitute a well-reasoned extension of the Supreme Court’s TRW
decision, it also contradicts itself. The Auscape court suggested
that in the context of ownership, rather than infringement, actions
brought under the Copyright Act, the discovery accrual rule might
still constitute good law.173 The court, employing a two-pronged
analysis of both statutory construction and legislative intent, held
that the injury rule of accrual rule applies in the context of
copyright infringement actions, yet no provision in the Copyright
Act states that the Act’s statute of limitations provision treats
ownership claims and infringement claims differently.174
Consequently, the Auscape court erred when it stated that the
discovery rule might apply to copyright ownership claims, but not
to copyright infringement claims. While the Auscape court may
have over stepped its bounds, however, this does not detract from
172
173
174

Id.
Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 243–44.
17 U.S.C. § 507 (2000).
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the fact that the court’s conclusion that the injury rule is the
appropriate accrual rule in the context of copyright infringement
actions was accurate, or that its detailed analysis of both statutory
construction and legislative intent was enlightening.
B. Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent: How Should
Courts Interpret the Copyright Amendment of 1957?
No room for statutory interpretation exists within the Copyright
Act regarding the rule of accrual that applies to the Act’s statute of
limitations. The Auscape court was astute in stating that the text of
the Act was “not so illuminating” on the rule of accrual.175 Room
does exist, however, for analysis of Congress’ intent regarding the
appropriate rule of accrual, and that intent, gleaned through
legislative notes, appears to mandate adoption of the injury rule in
the context of the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations.176 On the
subject of legislative intent, the Auscape court made it quite clear
that Congress’ intent in 1957 was to correct the lack of certainty
that pervaded copyright law at the time.177 Pre-1957 copyright
infringement cases clearly indicate the uncertainty that pervaded
the relationship between the statute of limitations and copyright
law at that time.178 The ambiguous law governing statute of
limitations accrual questions in the context of copyright claims
prior to 1957 read: “an action for an infringement is governed by
the limitations existing for the class of actions to which it belongs
in the state where it is brought.”179 Before 1957, the injury rule
appeared to serve as the dominant accrual rule in copyright
infringement claims, regardless of the state.180 Since Congress
remained silent on the applicable rule of accrual in 1957, it is

175

Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
See 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N 1962 (“[D]ue to the nature of publication of works of art . . .
generally the person injured . . . can easily ascertain any infringement . . . [t]he committee
agrees that 3 years is an appropriate period for a uniform statute of limitations for civil
copyright actions and that it would provide an adequate opportunity for the injured party
to commence his action.”).
177
Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
178
See, e.g., Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Price, 170 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1948); Pathe Exch.,
Inc. v. Dalke Universal Film Exchs., Inc., 49 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1931).
179
Local Trademarks, 170 F.2d at 717.
180
Id. at 719.
176
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logical to assume that it accepted the status quo at the time: the
injury rule.181 Moreover, Congress remains free to change the
statute of limitations provision in the Copyright Act, to mandate
application of a specific rule of accrual if it deems such action
necessary.
Interestingly, few copyright infringement cases
implicating accrual of the statute of limitations arose between 1957
and 1976.182 One case decided during this period adopted the
injury rule as the appropriate rule of accrual in the context of the
Copyright Act.183 Until recently, the status quo accrual rule in
copyright actions implicating statute of limitations concerns
appears to have been the injury rule.
C. Policy Considerations: Should Policy Dictate Which Rule
Applies to Copyright Infringement?
Policy considerations offer some insight as to which accrual
rule courts should adopt when statute of limitations concerns arise
in copyright infringement actions. In Skwira, the First Circuit
completed its TRW analysis without confronting any explicit
exceptions within the pertinent statute of limitations that might
govern application of a given accrual rule, although the court did
address policy concerns when it held the discovery rule was a
proper accrual rule in the context of the FTCA.184 Courts are free
to consider policy concerns such as fairness to the defendant,

181

See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (explaining that Congress intended the statute
of limitations to run upon infringement and not upon discovery).
182
See, e.g., Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183,
1188 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining to address statute of limitations as appellee’s
alternate grounds for dismissal because of court’s decision regarding infringement);
Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 912 (10th Cir. 1975) (the trial court
held that the statute of limitations did not apply “because Telex had fraudulently
concealed the fact that they had misappropriated IBM’s trade secrets”); Prather v. Neva
Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that the statute of
limitations barred plaintiff’s action); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir.
1970) (discussing statutes of limitation and continuing torts); Gordon v. Vincent
Youmans, Inc., 358 F.2d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 1965) (statute of limitations issue was not
before the court on appeal).
183
See Baxter v. Curtis Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (holding
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last act of infringement).
184
See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 67, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2003).
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efficiency, and institutional legitimacy185 while weighing which
accrual rule is appropriate in the context of the Copyright Act’s
statute of limitations provision.
While Suzette Malveaux
addressed policy concerns in the context of statute of limitations
questions related to the issue of reparations,186 applying these
same considerations in the realm of the Copyright Act may help
illuminate the appropriate accrual rule for copyright infringement
litigation.
1. Fairness to the Defendant
Three interests are prominent in ensuring fairness for the
defendant: “(1) providing repose for the defendant; (2) promoting
accuracy in fact finding; and (3) curtailing plaintiff misconduct.”187
a) Providing Repose for Defendants
Individuals need certainty and finality.188 Defendants should
not need to concern themselves with the prospect of financial
burdens arising from potential lawsuits indefinitely.189 Returning
to the hypothetical case of the artist from the introduction to this
Note, one might recall that one of the friends who purchased the
artist’s interpretation of a Superman comic book became
financially unstable 10 years after he purchased the artist’s creation
and elected to sell the comic on eBay.190 Application of the
discovery rule would not bar DC Comics from commencing
copyright infringement litigation against the artist for his original
infringement of the company’s Superman-related copyrights.
Adoption of the injury rule, however, would bar DC Comics from
litigating a claim against the artist stemming from his original
infringement. It is difficult to fathom that permitting DC Comics
to sue the artist twenty years after the date of the original
infringement would promote fairness for any defendant. The
185

Suzette Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73–81 (2005).
186
Id.
187
Id. at 75.
188
See id.
189
Id. at 76.
190
See supra Introduction.
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injury rule better serves the interest of offering repose to potential
copyright infringement defendants.
b) Promoting Accuracy in Evidence
Promoting accuracy in evidence by requiring a plaintiff to
bring his claim as soon as possible constitutes an equally important
interest.191 In the artist hypothetical, the evidence is easily
accessible and the certainty of infringement is unquestionable. In
most copyright infringement cases, availability of physical
evidence of infringement is a non-issue. While in a criminal or
personal injury case evidence may degrade or even disappear
altogether over time, in a copyright infringement action access to
physical evidence of infringement—whether the tangible evidence
of infringement is a comic book as in the hypothetical, a song as in
Bridgeport, or a film as in Kourtis—continues indefinitely.192
Consequently, neither the discovery rule nor the injury rule harms
the interest of promoting accurate evidence.
c) Preventing Plaintiff Misconduct
Ascertaining the appropriate accrual for copyright infringement
litigation requires analysis of three methods of preventing plaintiff
misconduct: “(1) preventing fraud; (2) promoting diligence; and
(3) leveling the playing field between the parties.”193
i. Fraud
Courts can prevent plaintiff misconduct by preventing fraud.
They can prevent fraud by proscribing plaintiffs from filing claims
premised on evidence that the courts cannot test for accuracy.194
While neither the discovery rule nor the injury rule unequivocally
prevent fraud, the latter rule is better suited to accomplish this aim
in that it forces plaintiffs to file claims closer to the date of
infringement. Admittedly, a plaintiff could file a claim ten years
after an instance of infringement relying on perfectly legitimate
191

Id.
See, e.g., Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005); Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2004).
193
See Malveaux, supra note 185, at 77.
194
See id.
192
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evidence, but evidence less than three years old is more likely to be
reliable than evidence ten years old. Consequently, imposition of a
concrete time frame within which a plaintiff must commence a
copyright infringement action under the injury rule might help to
prevent instances of plaintiff fraud.
ii. Diligence on the Part of the Plaintiff
Diligence on the part of the plaintiff “stimulate[s] activity and
punish[es] negligence.”195 The injury rule forces plaintiffs to
remain vigilant of their intellectual property. Sophisticated
copyright holders, however, would exhibit diligence regardless of
which accrual rule governs copyright infringement actions.
Through close monitoring of all transactions related to their
copyrights, such parties would likely learn of any infringement
shortly after it occurred. Consequently, such parties would possess
the knowledge necessary to commence litigation well before the
Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations precluded them
from filing claims, regardless of whether the discovery rule or the
injury rule controlled accrual calculations.
The prevalence of the Internet further blurs the importance of
determining which accrual rule applies in the context of copyright
infringement actions. The Internet’s precipitation of dramatic
increases in both the quantity of information available to diligent
copyright holders and the speed of availability has enabled such
watchful parties to monitor use of their copyrighted property with
relative ease. Under the discovery rule, accrual against a statute of
limitations commences once a potential plaintiff knows or should
reasonably know of an instance of unlawful conduct.196 Diligent
copyright holders will know, or should reasonably know, of an
infringing use as soon as news of such a use appears on the
Internet. Consequently, as technology steadily advances, the
difference between discovery and injury rule accrual calculations
diminishes. Noted legal scholar Lawrence Lessig asserts that in
this age of new technology, Digital Rights Management (“DRM”)

195

Id. at 78 (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).
See Bridgeport Music, Inc., v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir.
2004).
196
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will strictly enforce copyright compliance on the Internet.197
Lessig fears that as DRM advances and its prominence increases,
enforcement of copyrights will become easier and eventually so
pervasive that it will destroy the public domain.198 Lessig raises
the specter of expanding, increasingly restrictive copyright laws
that will—with assistance from DRM—make it easier for
copyright holders to police infringement.199
In the hypothetical situation regarding the artist’s unauthorized
creation of Superman comic books, however, it would have been
nearly impossible for even a party as vigilant and sophisticated as
DC Comics to learn of the five infringing works until one of them
turned up on eBay. Adherence to the injury rule in copyright
infringement actions would preclude even the most diligent
plaintiffs from commencing litigation premised on the original
infringement in such a situation. Even under the injury rule,
however, DC Comics could still move to enjoin the artist’s friend
from proceeding with the eBay auction, and file suit to curtail any
subsequent infringement of its Superman copyrights by the artist
and those who purchased his works.200
The extent of infringement and the likelihood that a lawful
copyright holder will discover infringement are highly correlated.
As the potential harm from infringement increases, it becomes
increasingly likely that a copyright holder will learn of the
infringing activity. In the example of the artist’s unauthorized
creation of Superman comic books, it would be far easier for DC
Comics to uncover news of the infringement if the artist sold his
five comic books for $500,000 than it would be if the artist sold his
creations for $500. The larger the amount of money changing
hands, the greater the probability of public knowledge of the
transaction, and consequently, the greater the likelihood that the
copyright holder will learn of the transaction involving the
infringing article.

197

Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 62
(2006).
198
See id.
199
See id. at 63.
200
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Conversely, as technology advances, it becomes increasingly
easy to access copyrighted works intending to violate copyright
laws.201 While the Internet allows diligent plaintiffs to police
infringement efficiently, it is impossible to monitor every crevice
of the Internet vigilantly, particularly because the Internet only
increases in size over time. Since 1976, the level of real world,
practical protection against infringement that lawful creators and
owners of copyrighted material enjoy has steadily diminished
because of the concomittant evolution of computer technology.202
Application of the injury rule to statute of limitations accrual
calculations in the realm of copyright infringement actions would
further weaken such protection.203 Lessig notes that Digital Rights
Management technology is not yet widely used , and there is much
debate over whether it ever will be.204 As technology advances,
sophisticated and vigilant copyright holders continue to learn of
instances of infringement more quickly, which in turn works, from
a practical standpoint, to diminish the importance of the difference
between the accrual standards of the discovery rule and the injury
rule. Technological advancement, however, also makes it more
difficult for rights holders to stridently police and protect their
copyrights. The more liberal accrual methodology of the discovery
rule is more effective than the restrictive injury rule in ameliorating
the policing difficulties that technological advancements
precipitate.
iii. Leveling the Playing Field
On a truly level litigation playing field, defendants should be
able to mount the best defense possible at trial.205 In order to
further such strong defenses, policies must protect unsuspecting
potential defendants who unwittingly fail to preserve evidence that
201
See Britton Payne, Super-Grokster: Untangling Secondary Liability, Comic Book
Heroes and the DMCA, and a Filtering Solution for Infringing Digital Creations,
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939, 947–52 (2006) (discussing the
Copyright Act of 1976, its deficiencies in the face of technology, and how it has tried to
adapt).
202
Id.
203
Looking at peer-to-peer sharing software, torrents and Napster-like entities, it
becomes apparent that copyright infringement has increased.
204
Lessig, supra note 197, at 63.
205
Malveaux, supra note 185, at 78.
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would aid their cause from covertly litigious plaintiffs who amass
substantial amounts of evidence before filing suit.206 As addressed
supra, most evidence of copyright infringement exists inherently
within a given allegedly infringing work. Adoption of one accrual
rule over another is immaterial and unrelated to the availability of
such tangible evidence of infringement. Litigants, however, rely
on additional evidence in order to prove or disprove infringement.
When the allegations in a copyright infringement action do not
pertain to direct copying, for example, the defendant’s access, or
lack thereof, to the works the defendant allegedly infringed
becomes an important consideration.207 In such a case, plaintiffs
may preserve evidence of the defendant’s access to the allegedly
infringed works, while unknowing eventual defendants discard
evidence disproving such access. Even the issue of such other
evidence, however, is irrelevant in weighing which accrual rule to
apply, because when plaintiffs preserve evidence of infringement,
they simultaneously demonstrate knowledge of infringement,
thereby commencing accrual of the statute of limitations under the
discovery rule. Consequently, both the injury rule and the
discovery rule level the playing field for defendants by
discouraging plaintiffs from clandestinely gathering and preserving
evidence long before commencing litigation. In the context of a
level playing field, the different accrual methods of the two rules
are irrelevant.
2. Efficiency Concerns
Courts promote efficiency through reducing costs, clearing
dockets, and making judicial determinations simple and easy to
decide.208
a) Reduction of Costs
Another aim of implementing a statute of limitations is
reducing the transaction costs inherent to the process of gathering

206
207
208

See id. at 79.
Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999).
Malveaux, supra note 185, at 79.
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evidence.209 As the time span between an instance of infringement
and commencement of litigation related to this infringement
grows, the transaction costs of gathering evidence necessary for
litigation balloon.210 As discussed supra, tangible evidence of
copyright infringement is typically not difficult to obtain, so the
transaction costs associated with acquiring such evidence are
already relatively low. Consequently, adoption of one accrual rule
over the other would have little effect on reducing the already low
transaction costs associated with gathering evidence in copyright
infringement actions.
b) Clear Dockets
Courts also foster efficiency by reducing their heavy
caseloads.211 They achieve this aim through curtailing the
proliferation of excessive filings and frivolous claims.212 While in
the example of the artist’s infringement of copyrights relating to
Superman DC Comics’ claims are meritorious, most claims
plaintiffs initiate years after an instance of unlawful conduct do not
share this distinction. As a general proposition, the greater the
time span between allegedly unlawful conduct and the filing of a
suit related to such conduct, the greater the likelihood that the
claims in the suit are frivolous.213 Under the discovery rule,
plaintiffs can file suit twenty years after an instance of copyright
infringement, so long as they first knew or should have known of
such infringement no more than three years prior to their
commencement of litigation. The discovery rule thus cuts against
the aspirations of efficiency inherent in the adoption of a statute of
limitations. The injury rule is far better suited to clearing court
dockets and inhibiting the filing of frivolous claims, and is
therefore more likely to promote efficiency.

209
210
211
212
213

Id.
Id.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 80.
Id.
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c) Simple Judicial Determinations
A clear rule that precludes plaintiffs from filing claims once a
finite period has elapsed provides courts with “structure and
clarity.”214 When courts apply the discovery rule, they forfeit the
luxury of such a lucid methodology, replacing a concrete
determination of when infringement first occurred with an
inherently ambiguous pronouncement on when a plaintiff first
knew or should have known of an instance of infringement. In the
example of the artist’s infringement of DC Comics’ Superman
copyrights, how would a court determine when DC Comics first
knew or should have known of the artist’s infringement? One
might conclude that even the most prudent plaintiff would not
learn of the artist’s infringement until the eBay auction. Many
Internet sites, however, host web-columns chronicling insider
information pertaining to comic books. One such web-column is
“lying in the gutters.”215 If this web-column posted an article
about the artist’s five unique comic books shortly after the artist
initially created these works, does the information in the column
constitute sufficient notice to commence accrual of the statute of
limitations under the discovery rule?216 Should courts task
plaintiffs with the responsibility of knowing about infringement of
their copyrights even when the only news of such infringement
comes from obscure or unreliable sources? Adoption of the
discovery rule encourages excessive ambiguity in responding to
these questions, eviscerates the prospect of simple judicial
determinations, and fosters a lack of uniformity between similar
cases. Alternatively, the injury rule furnishes a clear, unambiguous
standard that fosters clarity, certainty, and consistency in judicial
determinations.

214

Id. at 81.
Rich Johnston, Lying in the Gutters, COMIC BOOK RESOURCES, http://www.comic
bookresources.com/columns/index.cgi?column=litg (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
216
A judge may determine that the posting of this web-column is sufficient notice that a
plaintiff could have known of the infringement, and, therefore, is barred under the
discovery rule. Alternately, a judge could argue that one web-column, in such a vast
forum like the Internet, is not enough notice to bar a claim.
215
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3. Institutional Legitimacy
In order for the legal system to function properly, the public
must believe that well-founded rules underlie the system and
protect it from the specter of judicial whim.217 Limitation of an
individual judge’s discretion promotes legitimacy throughout the
judicial system. While the discovery rule curtails an individual
judge’s discretion to a certain extent, the unambiguous
methodology of the injury rule is better suited to minimize the
prospect of judicial prejudice.
Equally important to the
institutional legitimacy of the judicial system, however, is the
system’s ability to ensure that it does not exclude plaintiffs with
valid claims from the legal process.218 Plaintiffs with meritorious
claims whom the system precludes from persisting with litigation
will become disillusioned with the judicial system.219 Adoption of
the discovery rule precludes fewer claims than use of the injury
rule. Consequently, the discovery rule may better serve this
second aim of institutional legitimacy. Ultimately, the weighing of
institutional legitimacy concerns requires careful balancing. If
courts adopt the plaintiff-friendly discovery rule, they risk
precariously exposing the rule of the legal system to judicial whim.
If, however, they instead implement the injury rule more favorable
to defendants, in so doing they could hamper the administration of
truly equitable justice.
Perhaps acting in conformance with Congress’ intent is the best
means of furthering the legitimacy of the judicial system, for under
this approach, the citizenry would likely attribute any perceived
shortcomings of the legal system to the petulantly intractable will
of Congress, rather than intransigent judges. Citizens upset about a
given legal rule will address their displeasure to their elected
officials rather than the judiciary, since if a legal rule emanates
from Congress, Congress is responsible for the rule’s existence. In
applying such a rule, the judiciary could assert that it is merely
217
See Malveaux, supra note 185, at 81. If our judicial system is illegitimate then
society would not follow the courts and could, in our democratic system, ask Congress
and the Executive to limit judicial power. The Executive, in particular, can limit judicial
power by refusing to enforce the Judiciary’s decisions.
218
Id.
219
Id.
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doing its job by following Congress’s mandates. The burden to
make changes to such a rule would fall squarely on Congress. This
passing-the-buck approach to maintaining judicial legitimacy, like
the Auscape court’s analysis of legislative intent—with which it
shares many similarities—would favor adoption of the injury rule
for statute of limitations accrual calculations in the context of
copyright infringement actions.
4. Policy Conclusion
On the whole, the injury rule is better-tailored to address the
aforementioned policy concerns than the discovery rule. Adoption
of the injury rule offers the prospect of clear, unambiguous, and
uniform accrual calculations without impinging on considerations
that originally led Congress to impose a statute of limitations on
copyright infringement actions. Application of the discovery rule
would only detract from such aspirations.
D. Are the Goals of Copyright Law Better Served by a Particular
Rule?
Copyright law aims to “balance the interests of creators
protecting their works and the constitutionally mandated public
interest in the advancement of technology.”220 As copyright law
has evolved, it has enabled rights holders to protect their
copyrights with increasing ease.221 Technological advancements,
however, have fostered a commensurate increase in the degree of
ease with which unlawful actors can infringe upon copyrighted
works.222
1. The Injury Rule and the Goals of Copyright Law
It remains unclear whether imposition of the injury rule would
further either of the goals of copyright law. Working under the
shadow of the pro-defendant injury rule, creators might become
less inclined to produce works, knowing that once they complete
their works they will have to exhibit extreme vigilance if they wish
220
221
222

Payne, supra note 201, at 945–46.
Id. at 946–47.
Id. at 947.
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to monitor and police effectively unlawful appropriation and
infringement of the copyrights they hold in their works. Moreover,
the injury may not even foster the goal of advancing the arts and
sciences. This aim stems from the notion that those who seek to
create new works may need to utilize older works in order to create
something new.223 Mandating that copyrights expire after a period
of reasonable duration allows aspiring creators to either contract
for the right to produce a work derived from or premised on an
older work, or else wait until the older work enters the public
domain before commencing work on their derivative creations.224
Adoption of the injury rule appears at first glance to reward
technologically advanced copyright infringers at the expense of
promoting the legal advancement of technology, but perhaps
copyright holders aware of the injury rule would be more likely to
grant aspiring creators rights to produce works derived from or
premised on their copyrighted works through contract in
anticipation of the fact that if they failed to do so, these aspiring
creators might well become actual infringers. Fears over the
impossibility of effectively policing infringement on the part of
copyright holders could thus engender a wider and more prevalent
distribution of rights to copyrighted works, and in so doing lead to
technological advancements. Furthermore, when copyright holders
contract away some of the rights in their works to other parties, the
various parties share the burden of protecting such works from
infringement. Thus, on some level, the injury rule could further
the advancement of technology.
2. The Discovery Rule and the Goals of Copyright Law
While adoption of the discovery rule may not foster
technological advancement, it certainly would increase the quotient
of statutory infringement protection copyright holders enjoy.
Judicial implementation of the discovery rule would engender
stringent protection of copyrighted works by allowing copyright
223

Melanie Costantino, Fairly Used: Why Google’s Book Project Should Prevail under
the Fair Use Defense, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235 (2006).
224
See Ashok Chandra, Crisis of Indefinite Consequence: How Derivative Works
Exception and the Lanham Act Undercut the Remunerative Value of Termination of
Transfers, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 250 (2005).
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owners to commence litigation once they learn of infringement,
rather than at the time of infringement, or shortly thereafter.
Would such increased protection tip the scales, disturbing the
precarious balance between protecting individual rights and
advancing technology that courts diligently attempt to maintain in
the realm of copyright? Interestingly enough, the answer is no.
Because of the sophistication of the actors in the copyright market,
adoption of the discovery rule would not drastically change the
timeframe within which plaintiffs are able to bring claims. If
adoption of the discovery rule would expand the timeframe within
which plaintiffs could file copyright infringement suits at all, it
would do so only slightly, as courts would rule under almost all
circumstances that sophisticated plaintiffs learned—or else
reasonably should have learned—of any instances of substantial
infringement well within the three-year time limit the Copyright
Act’s statute of limitations imposes.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note examined the costs and benefits of adopting either
the discovery rule or the injury rule for statute of limitations
accrual calculations in the context of copyright infringement
actions. Courts following the precedent of the majority of circuit
courts and the decisions of the Supreme Court narrowly would
likely adopt the discovery rule.225 Conversely, courts weighing
only the effect of a particular accrual rule on statute of limitations
policy concerns would likely embrace the injury rule, based upon
the dual goals of copyright law: protection of individual creative
rights and the advancement of the arts and sciences for the benefit
of society.226 While technological advances have made it easier
for rights holders to police infringement of their copyrights, these
very same advances have also made it much easier for infringers to
access and appropriate copyrighted materials. Adopting the
discovery rule redoubles only slightly the aspects of copyright
protection that technological advancements have already whittled
away.
225
226

See supra Part IV(A)(1) and accompanying notes.
See supra Part IV(C)(4) and accompanying notes.
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The most important goal of any statute of limitations, however,
is repose. While adoption of the discovery rule renders repose
slightly more difficult to attain, as technology continues to
advance, plaintiffs will find themselves hard-pressed to present
claims of infringement that occurred twenty years ago premised on
assertions that they did not and should not have known of the
alleged infringement earlier. The discovery rule’s affect on repose
is thus minimal, and the potential benefits derived from adoption
of this rule outweigh any potentially adverse effects.
Consequently, courts should adopt the discovery rule for statute of
limitations accrual calculations in the context of copyright
infringement claims in order to protect lawful copyright holders to
the most thorough extent possible.
Our hearts may not go out to DC Comics and its inability to
bring a claim against a single artist, especially since DC Comics is
a subsidiary of Time Warner, a major corporation. But if the artist
instead appropriated copyrights pertaining to the most popular
character in a fledgling comic company’s roster, both the
infringement itself and its effect on comic book company’s
business would be far more significant. As this Note addressed
previously, questions implicating statute of limitations accrual
concerns do not arise often in the context of copyright
infringement actions. In some cases this Note examined, the
question of the applicable rule of accrual was inconsequential. In
others, adoption of one accrual rule over another affected whether
damages were awarded. The question of the applicable accrual
rule proved dispositive in only a few cases, but these few cases do
in fact matter. In order to grow and flourish, the aforementioned
fledgling comic books company must be capable of stridently
protecting its copyrights. Big corporations rarely suffer damage
from anything but the most rampant, unrestrained infringement,
particularly since they have the greatest amount of resources with
which to police potential copyright violations. It is the cases
involving the upstart creator, the fresh-faced musician, and the
young computer programmer where the accrual issue is truly of
great import. Copyright law strives to promote the arts and
sciences while protecting intellectual property. The arts and
sciences cannot advance if the law fails to safeguard the
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intellectual property rights of the upstarts, dreamers, and
entrepreneurs, those most in need of the law’s protection.

